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 WAIVER: CANUTE AGAINST THE TIDE? 
 
Shirley Shipman 
 
A.  Introduction 
 
Increasingly in Europe, and in the wider world, an individual1 who seeks to enforce his 
legal rights is encouraged or coerced to view his dispute as a problem to be solved 
through mediation rather than a right to be enforced.  A tidal wave of ‘encouragement’ to 
turn to mediation and other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures to resolve 
private law disputes2, takes form through the use of standardised contractual clauses 
(which by their nature are not negotiable), or due to encouragement by legal advisors or 
the courts (with the strong backing of political will and, in some instances, through 
legislative force).  Any settlement agreed at mediation, in the main, precludes access to 
the courts3.  This has the potential to conflict with Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which provides that everyone ‘[i]n the determination of 
his civil rights and obligations …  is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.’   
 
There have, as yet, been relatively few applications to the ECtHR seeking to claim that 
coerced recourse to ADR procedures is in violation of an individual’s right of access to 
                                                 
Thanks are due to Prof Ilona Cheyne and to Prof Lucy Vickers for their comments on earlier versions of 
this article.  Some of the ideas in this article were first explored in abridged form in S Shipman ‘Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, The Threat of Adverse Costs and the Right of Access to Court’ D Dwyer (ed) The Civil 
Procedure Rules Ten Years On (Oxford University Press 2009) . 
1 Individuals in this article also includes other bodies with legal standing to bring or defend a claim 
2 In England and Wales individuals must also consider the use of ADR procedures (in particular, 
mediation) prior to seeking judicial review of public authority decision making (Pre-Action Protocol for 
Judicial Review [3.1]-[3.4] 
3 In England and Wales (s is widely the case), the arbitral award takes the form of a binding judgment that 
is enforceable through the national courts unless the arbitral tribunal lacked jurisdiction to make the award 
(s67 Arbitration Act (AA) 1996), there is serious irregularity (s68 AA 1996), there is a successful appeal on 
a point of law (s69 AA 1996).  Article 6 of the European Mediation Directive (Directive 2008/52 on certain 
aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters) requires Member States to ensure that the content of 
agreements reached through mediation should be made enforceable unless it is contrary to the law of the 
relevant Member State or the law of the Member State does not provide for its enforceability.  This last 
point seems somewhat contradictory. 
 2 
court4.  Whilst there are undoubted benefits to mediation and other ADR processes, it 
would seem likely that, as the pressure increases on individuals to resolve their disputes 
away from the national courts, the ECtHR will be asked to make decisions on whether 
and in what circumstances the use of mediation is in violation of Article 6(1).  However, 
unless an individual has been compelled to mediate a claim, a State is able to argue that 
the individual has waived his right to Article 6(1) procedural protection.  The approach 
that the ECtHR takes to the development of the doctrine of waiver will, therefore, be 
significant in determining whether Article 6(1) retains its ability to safeguard the legal 
rights of individuals through the national courts and also whether the important public 
functions of civil justice remain protected.   
 
This article sets out the context for the increased use of mediation, analyses the doctrine 
of waiver in the case law of the ECtHR, and suggests that there is the potential for the 
ECtHR to find that, in certain circumstances at least, coerced mediation is in violation of 
an individual’s right of access to court under Article 6(1.  However, in recognition that 
mediation offers benefits in relation to dispute resolution, it will also, suggest that the 
doctrine may be developed in such a way as to leave open the possibility that a State 
which encourages or makes compulsory the use of alternative procedures may justify 
their use, at least in the circumstances of the individual case. 
 
B.  Mediation and Article 6(1) ECHR 
 
1) The Tide of ADR in Civil Justice: Increasing Pressure to Mediate 
 
The reasons for the current emphasis on mediation and other forms of ADR in relation to 
civil disputes are wide-ranging.  The perceived benefits to the parties, in the event of a 
successful mediation, from the perspective of efficiency and, frequently, in terms of 
                                                 
4 An individual may claim that he or she has been denied access to court either where there is a restriction 
on access for refusal to comply with an order to attend an ADR hearing or where the individual has 
attended an ADR process and the resultant award or settlement precludes access to the courts or the 
individual has exhausted their funds and, consequently, is unable to pursue the claim for financial reasons.  
See S Shipman ‘Compulsory Mediation: the Elephant in the Room’ (2011) 30 Civil Justice Quarterly 163, 
165-166 
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enabling business relationships to continue and reputations to remain publicly intact are 
well recognised.  There also appears to be a wider, systemic, aspiration that mediation 
may offer a cure for a number of difficulties faced in civil justice systems across Europe 
and elsewhere.  These include issues of significant delay in processing claims through the 
court system5, as well as resource and budgetary constraints6. There has also been 
political concern voiced over the economic burden placed on businesses due to a 
perceived ‘move towards a compensation culture’ in England and Wales that is ‘driven 
by litigation’7.  Hence, mediation is viewed as attractive since it is perceived as a less 
protracted and expensive means of resolving disputes.  Additionally, since mediated 
claims frequently settle for a lower sum than negotiated or litigated claims, and parties 
usually meet their own costs, there are further economic advantages for businesses in 
using such procedures8. 
 
                                                 
5 Italy, for example, has faced numerous successful claims before the ECtHR on the ground that 
proceedings have failed be heard within a reasonable time.  The Italian Ministry of Justice is hopeful that 
the recent introduction of compulsory mediation for a range of civil claims will help to deal with the issue 
of delay (European Conference on Mediation, Turin 2 December 2012). 
6 In England and Wales, for example, the civil legal aid bill has been much reduced and it is expected that 
the costs of the civil justice system should be met by the users: Prof Dame H Genn ‘Civil Justice: How 
Much is Enough?’ in H Genn Judging Civil Justice: The Hamlyn Lectures 2008 (Cambridge University 
Press 2009) 48 and 45-51.  S Shipman ‘Court Approaches to ADR in the Civil Justice System’ (2006) 25 
CJQ 181, 181-186.  According to Sir Henry Brooke, civil justice produced a profit of £30 million in 2006 
which, evidence suggests, has been diverted to aid deficits caused by criminal justice overspend: Sir H 
Brooke ‘Should the Civil Courts be Unified’ (Judicial Office August 2008) [75] cited in H Genn ‘Civil 
Justice: How Much is Enough’ 48 
7 Ministerial Forward: Kenneth Clarke, Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, and Jonathan 
Djanogly, Justice Minister ‘Solving Disputes in the County Courts: Creating a Simpler, Quicker and More 
Proportionate System – a Consultation on Reforming Civil Justice in England and Wales’ (Consultation 
Paper CP6/2011 March 2011) http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/consultations/solving-disputes-county-
courts.pdf)  This impetus behind a heightened agenda for mediation and other forms of ADR has been 
described by Prof Genn as the ‘anti-law discourse’.  See Prof Dame H Genn ‘ADR and Civil Justice: 
What’s Justice got to do with it?’ in The Hamlyn Lectures 2008: Judging Civil Justice’ (Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 80.  See also M Galanter ‘A World Without Trials’ (2006) Journal of Dispute 
Resolution 7. 
8 See Lord Justice Jackson ‘Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Preliminary Report’ May 2009, 302-319, for 
an example of the perceived costs saved through settlement at mediation and the less favourable view of 
parties to unsuccessful mediation in a survey undertaken by the King’s College Centre of Construction Law 
and Dispute Resolution in the Technology and Construction Court from June 2006 to May 2008.  
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications-and-reports/review-of-civil-lit igation-costs/reports 
Also, H Genn ‘ADR and Civil Justice) (n8) 108-113 and footnotes to empirical surveys and S Shipman 
‘Court Approaches to ADR’ (n7) 199-204 and footnotes. 
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Hence, in recent years, mediation, alongside other forms of ADR9, has become a 
progressively prominent feature in the civil justice landscape10.  Increasingly, there is 
political will, a legislative basis and judicial authority to encourage and even to compel 
parties to undertake mediation or other ADR processes.11  In Europe, the European 
Commission has stated that:  
 
The European Union actively promotes the methods of alternative dispute resolution  … 
such as mediation …  encouraging the use of mediation and other forms of ADR assists 
in the resolution of disputes and helps to avoid the worry, time and cost associated with 
court-based litigation and so assists citizens in a real way to secure their legal rights.12  
 
Italy has introduced a compulsory mediation stage for resolving a significant range of 
civil and commercial disputes13.  In Spain parties to employment disputes may be 
required to attend mediation before referral to the courts.14  In the Czech Republic 
legislation will make mediation compulsory in certain family proceedings and there are 
significant financial advantages for parties who participate in a successful mediation 
process.15   
 
The political push to a greater use of ADR - principally mediation - in England and 
Wales is also explicit16.  From April 2011, legal aid has not been available for family 
proceedings (with limited exceptions) unless the parties have first attended a mediation 
awareness meeting (designed to encourage the parties to make use of a mediation process 
                                                 
9 For example, arbitration is frequently the method of choice for dispute resolution in the commercial 
context.  Arbitration clauses routinely occur as non-negotiable in standard form contracts. 
10 H Genn ‘ADR and Civil Justice’ (n8) 79  
11 European Mediation Directive (Directive 2008/52 on certain aspects of mediation in civil and 
commercial matters) 
12 https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_eu_overview_on_mediation-63-EU-en.do 
13 Legislative Decree 28/2010: effective from 20 March 2011 
14 https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_mediation_in_member_states-64-en.do.   
15 ibid 
16 Former Justice Minister, Jonathan Djanogly,  made public his commitment to the use of ADR in civil 
justice on a number of occasions, stating in May 2011 that ‘mediation plays a critical part in my plans for 
the future civil justice system’ (2011 Civil Mediation Council Conference).  In March 2012 Mr Djanogly 
told law students at BPP that he ‘strongly believe[s] that for the vast majority of disputes in civil, family 
and administrative justice, [mediation] can be a better way of reaching a resolution for all concerned - 
quicker, less expensive, certainly less stressful, and a solution that the parties themselves will buy into 
because they have shaped the outcome.’ http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/features/mediation-quicker,-
cheaper-and-less-stressful 
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in suitable cases).17  In June 2011 the Ministry of Justice launched the Dispute Resolution 
Commitment (DRC)18 expressly stated to ensure that Government Departments and 
Agencies ‘lead by example in resolving disputes quickly and effectively’.19  The DRC 
includes a commitment that all contracts with other parties will include an ‘appropriate 
dispute resolution clause’.  Thus parties seeking to win any Government contract have no 
option but to agree to an ADR method of resolution for any disputes arising out of the 
contractual relationship.  Whilst suggested methods of ADR include Early Neutral 
Evaluation and Arbitration, guidance issued by the Ministry of Justice states that 
mediation ‘should be seen as the preferred dispute resolution route in most disputes when 
conventional negotiation has failed or is making slow progress’20.  The DRC goes further 
than insisting on the use of ADR procedures for contractual disputes, it also advocates its 
use for ‘other claims’ brought by individuals against Government Departments and 
Agencies, although the DRC guidance suggests that claims involving the abuse of power, 
Public law suits and Human Rights issues may not be suitable for ADR but does not rule 
out the possibility21.   
 
In the private sector there is an expectation that parties will consider an ADR procedure 
prior to commencing litigation.  Pre-Action Protocols (PAPs), which govern pre-action 
party behaviour in relation to a wide range of potential civil claims and, notably, judicial 
review, contain advice on the use of ADR procedures as follows 22: 
 
The parties should consider whether some form of alternative dispute resolution 
procedure would be more suitable than litigation, and if so, endeavour to agree which 
                                                 
17http://www.legalservices.gov.uk/docs/fains_and_mediation/UnderstandingPubliclyfundedFamilyMediatio
n.pdf 
18 http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/courts/mediation/drc-may2011.pdf.  This builds on the ADR 
Pledge, whereby all Government Departments and Agencies pledged to consider and use ADR ‘in all 
suitable cases where the other party accepts it’   
19 http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/courts/mediation/drc-may2011.pdf 2 
20 Dispute Resolution Commitment: Guidance for Government Departments and Agencies 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/courts/mediation/drc-guidance-may2011.pdf [7] 
21  ibid [2.5].  For an interesting empirical study of the potential value and limits of mediation as an 
alternative to judicial review see V Bondy & L Mulcahy with M Doyle & V Reid  ‘Judicial Review and 
Mediation: An Empirical Study’ (Public Law Project London 2009) 
http://www.publiclawproject.org.uk/documents/MediationandJudicialReview.pdf 
22 See, for example, the Pre-Action Protocol on Defamation [3.7]-[3.9] and the Pre-Action Protocol on 
Judicial Review [3.1]-[3.4]: http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/protocol 
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form to adopt. Both the Claimant and Defendant may be required by the Court to provide 
evidence that alternative means of resolving their dispute were considered.  
      
The encouragement to ‘consider’ ADR is strengthened by the further advice that:  
 
Parties are warned that if the protocol is not followed (including this paragraph) then the 
Court must have regard to such conduct when determining costs 
 
Although, somewhat contradictorily, the PAPs also state that ‘it is expressly recognised 
that no party can or should be forced to mediate or enter into any form of ADR.’  Whilst 
the PAPs state that parties should not be ‘forced’ to mediate, it seems that parties face 
significant pressure to do so.  Alongside this, courts are also under a duty to encourage 
parties to undertake an ADR procedure where it is appropriate to do so23.  The ultimate 
sanction for unreasonable refusal to mediate (whether at the suggestion of the court or a 
litigation opponent) is an adverse costs award24.  The potential for adverse costs for 
refusal to mediate, particularly in a jurisdiction where the costs of litigation are high, 
together with a background of political pressure on the courts and legal advisors to 
encourage individuals to mediate their claims, the refusal to grant legal aid without a 
mediation awareness meeting in certain situations, all exert significant pressure.  The aim 
of these measures is clearly to persuade individuals to mediate their claims but, in doing 
so, an individual may forego his or her right to bring or defend the claim before the 
courts. 
 
2) The Public Importance of Civil Justice 
 
In the context of the civil justice system in England and Wales, settlement of disputes is 
the norm.  Since the introduction of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR) the system has 
been designed to encourage early settlement of disputes with a view to creating a more 
                                                 
23 Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) 1(4)(2)(e).  S Shipman ‘Court Approaches to ADR in the Civil Justice 
System’ (2006) 25 CJQ 181: highlights a number of means adopted by the court to encourage individuals to 
undertake mediation in particular, ranging from education and publicity to more robust approaches such as 
criticism, court orders and adverse costs awards. 
24 Halsey v Milton Keynes General Trust NHS [2004] EWCA Civ 576; [2004] 1 WLR 3002 [33].  See S 
Shipman ‘Court Approaches to ADR’ (n26) 181 
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efficient civil justice system and to saving party expense25.  In the context of a system 
which encourages settlement, it may be wondered why it is deemed worthwhile to 
consider the relationship between mediation and the right of access to court, even should 
mediation become a compulsory early intervention in the pre-litigation process.  The 
issue is that negotiated settlement, based on an early exchange of information or through 
Part 36 offers, is linked to the perceived legal merits of the claim and based on what is 
likely to be decided at trial, albeit with consideration to the expense saved through the 
avoidance of trial.  However, in relation to mediation, whilst it may be conducted in the 
‘shadow of the law’, it is based on interests rather than rights and the settlement 
agreement reached may be unrelated to the legal merits of the claim.  Moreover the 
mediation process itself is not subject to fair trial requirements.  Hence parties, in 
particular those who are not legally represented, will not necessarily be protected by the 
law or by the accountability afforded by public judgment and the independent judiciary.  
Whilst there are undoubted benefits to the mediation of claims, it is important to be 
mindful of the public importance of civil justice.  Civil justice is about more than one 
way, amongst a range of alternatives, for disputes to be solved.  It is more than an arena 
in which individuals and corporations can assert their rights and discover their 
obligations.  It is more than the site of protection for individuals and weaker parties who 
seek justice against those who exercise power of them, whether in the public or private 
domain.  It is also the place where there is public accountability for those whose wrongful 
acts may otherwise go unnoticed.  It is also the site in which individuals can take part in 
democracy, through the public dimension of justice and through the opportunity to 
engage with the law in a public court26. Moreover, it provides the secure legal backdrop 
against which business and economic activity can be carried out.  It, therefore, supports 
                                                 
25 Parties are required to comply with Pre-Action Protocols which require an early exchange of information 
in order to facilitate settlement and the CPR Part 36 offer procedure encourages claimants and respondents 
alike to make offers to settle.  Early settlement of disputes ensures that courts are not ‘clogged’ by cases 
that vacate their slots at the last moment.  However, it should be noted  that the push towards early 
settlement front loads costs since successful settlement depends on early exchange of information. 
26 Prof J Resnik ‘The Supreme Court 2010 Term: Comment: Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT & 
TV Concepcion, Wal-Mart v Dukes, and Turner v Rogers’ (2011) 125 (1) Harvard Law Review 78, 87-93 
& 132-133; Prof J Resnik ‘Courts in and out of sight, site and cite’ (2008) 53 Villanova Law Review 101-
138 
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‘economic activity and development’.27  Lord Justice Jackson has commented that whilst 
mediation has an important role in civil justice, it cannot take the place of the law and the 
courts:  
 
[Mediation] is rightly reducing the burden upon the civil courts and helping many parties to 
arrive at satisfactory resolutions of their disputes.  Nevertheless, the proper functioning of 
accessible civil courts alongside mediation is vital for the wellbeing of society and the 
economy.  Indeed mediation itself could not flourish, were it not for the existence of civil 
courts in the background, standing ready to enforce the parties’ rights and to coerce 
reluctant parties.28 
 
Against this backdrop, Article 6(1) has a significant role in maintaining and upholding 
the important function of civil justice.    
 
3) The relevance of Article 6(1) to Mediation in Civil Justice  
 
Under Article 6(1) an individual is entitled, in the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations, to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law.  Potentially there are at least three situations in 
which an applicant may seek to claim that his Article 6(1) right has been infringed in the 
context of the pressure to undertake mediation or other ADR procedures in civil justice.  
The first situation may occur where an individual has settled the claim at mediation and, 
consequently, is unable to pursue his or her claim through the courts.  Satisfaction rates 
with mediation outcomes are generally high but not universally so29.  In England and 
Wales at least, mediation hearings most usually last for one day, mediators may be keen 
                                                 
27 Prof Dame H Genn ‘What is Civil Justice For?’ in The Hamlyn Lectures 2008: Judging Civil Justice 
(Cambridge University Press 2010) 17 
28 Lord Justice Jackson ‘Review of Civil Litigation Costs’ (n9) 43 
29 Eg P Urwin et al ‘Evaluating the Use of Judicial Mediation in Employment Tribunals’ (Ministry of 
Justice Research Series 7/10 2010) 41-47; Prof Dame H Genn et al ‘Twisting Arms: Court Referred and 
Court Linked Mediation Under Judicial Pressure’ (Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/07 2007) eg 108-
111, 184-187  
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to encourage parties to reach an agreement30, and agreements may be concluded at the 
end of the day when parties are fatigued.  As Noone states:  
 
(a)lthough it is true that parties can never be forced to settle, once a mediation is under way a 
momentum builds which can place significant pressure upon all the parties to stay with the 
process all the way through to settlement 31.   
 
Moreover, since mediated agreements are based on party interests, rather than rights, 
there is the potential that they do not reflect the legal merits of any potential claim and, 
even where they do, there is evidence that parties settle for less than they would receive 
through negotiated settlement and that, frequently, parties bear their own costs32.   
Additionally, where the mediator is concerned with party empowerment in relation to the 
mediation process rather than with party satisfaction in relation to the outcome, the 
mediator is unlikely to interfere where a proposed settlement appears unfair.  Hence, it is 
feasible, that post-mediation, an individual may be dissatisfied with the mediated 
agreement and conclude that he or she would have been better served through a court 
judgment.  However, since mediated settlement agreements are drawn up as binding 
contracts it will not be possible to revisit the claim through the courts33.  Secondly, there 
is the possibility of an Article 6(1) challenge where an unsuccessful mediation exhausts 
funds which would otherwise be set aside for litigation costs34.  This may occur where a 
claim is relatively low value and lacking in complexity and would, therefore, take 
minimal court time.  Additionally, however, mediation can itself be highly expensive – 
particularly in complex multi-party litigation where expert witnesses and legal 
                                                 
30 Mediators, unlike the judiciary, do not have security of tenure and, hence, their reputation and future 
employment may depend on results. 
31 M Noone ‘Mediating Personal Injuries Disputes’ in J MacFarlane (ed) Rethinking Disputes: The 
Mediation Alternative’ (Cavendish Publishing Ltd London 1997) 23, 31 
32 eg Prof Dame H Genn ‘Central London County Court Pilot Mediation Scheme: Evaluation Report’ (LCD 
Research Series 5/98) 70, 71, 88-89, 97 
33 Mediation settlements in the context of civil disputes are drawn up as binding contracts which are 
enforceable through the courts.  Article 6 of the European Mediation Directive (Directive 2008/52 on 
certain aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters provides that EU Member States must ensure 
that the content of a written agreement arising from a mediation should be made enforceable at the request 
of the parties. 
34 This may occur where a claim is relatively low value and lacking in complexity and would, therefore, 
take minimal court time.  Additionally, however, mediation can itself be highly expensive – particularly in 
complex multi-party litigation where expert witnesses and legal representatives are involved.   
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representatives are involved.  Finally, where an individual has successfully brought or 
defended the claim through the courts but adverse costs have been awarded for 
unreasonable refusal to undertake an ADR procedure, he or she may argue that this 
renders the right of access to court ‘theoretical and illusory’ and is, therefore, effectively 
a denial of access to the court35.  This article is concerned with the first and second 
situations where, as a result of undertaking a mediation process, the individual is unable 
to bring or defend his or her claim before the courts and, hence, potentially argues that 
this is a denial of his or her right of access to court.  Provided that the nature of the 
particular dispute falls within the ECtHR autonomous definition of ‘civil rights and 
obligations’ and hence attracts Article 6(1) applicability, a State respondent would be 
able to counter such a claim if it can show that, in going to mediation, the individual 
applicant has waived his or her Article 6(1) right.   
 
C.  Waiver in Article 6(1) ECHR 
 
Whilst there is some doubt whether certain of the procedural rights encompassed in 
Article 6(1) are capable of waiver (for example the right to an impartial tribunal)36, the 
right of access to court is not an absolute right and the ECtHR has made it clear on 
several occasions that ‘neither the letter nor spirit of Article 6 of the Convention prevents 
a person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, the entitlement to 
the guarantees of a fair trial’37.  Hence the ECtHR has noted that a waiver of the right of 
access to court ‘is frequently encountered in civil matters, notably in the shape of 
arbitration clauses …’ and that, in principle, this does ‘not offend against the 
Convention’38.  However, in assessing whether an applicant has effectively waived a 
right under Article 6(1), a number of criteria must be satisfied: 1) the waiver of the right 
                                                 
35 The ECtHR reached this conclusion in the case of Stankov v Bulgaria (68490/01) 49 EHRR 7 where the 
imposition of a 4% court fee in relation to the part of the claim on which the applicant was unsuccessful 
rendered the right of access to court theoretical and illusory since it effectively wiped out a significant 
proportion of the damages won [54].  Adverse costs may be awarded for unreasonable refusal to mediate 
where mediation has been suggested by another party to litigation proceedings or by the court in its case 
management role: Halsey v Milton Keynes General Trust NHS [2004] EWCA Civ 576 [2004] 1 WLR 3002 
36 For example, it has been debated whether the right to an impartial tribunal is capable of waiver: Pfeifer v 
Plankl v Austria Series A No 227 (1992); Ozerov v Russia Application No 64962/01 Judgment 18/05/2010 
37 See, for example, Sejdovic v Italy -Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2006-II 
38 Deweer v Belgium (1980) 2 EHRR 429 
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must be established in an unequivocal manner39; 2) it must be attended by minimum 
safeguards commensurate to its importance40; 3) it must not run counter to any important 
public interest41; and 4) it must not be tainted by constraint42. 
 
1) The Right Must be Waived in an Unequivocal Manner 
 
Whilst waiver of an Article 6(1) right may be express or tacit43, no clear principles 
emerge from the ECtHR as to what constitutes waiver in an ‘unequivocal manner’.  The 
case law demonstrates that express waiver, either written or verbal, of an Article 6(1) 
right may be sufficient, even where the motive behind the waiver of the right is to protect 
others44.  However, the ECtHR construes the wording of such waiver strictly to ensure 
that it applies to the particular proceedings or right allegedly waived45.  Unequivocal 
waiver may be construed also by the ECtHR if established facts demonstrate an express 
intention not to attend proceedings46 but not where an individual has expressly requested 
an opportunity to exercise his Article 6(1) right47.   
                                                 
39 Le Compte, Van Leuven & De Meyere v Belgium Series A No 58 (1983) [35] 
40 Poitrimol v France Series A No 277 (1993) [31] 
41 Hakansson &  Sturesson v Sweden Series A No 171 (1990) [66] 
42 Deweer v Belgium (1980) 2 EHRR 429 
43 Hakansson & Sturesson v Sweden Series A No A171-A (1990) [66] 
44 See, for example, Makarenko v Russia Application No 5962/03 Judgment 21/12/2009 where the court 
held that the applicant had dismissed his lawyers and notified the court that he would no longer be present 
to defend himself in criminal libel proceedings in a ‘knowing, explicit and unequivocal manner’.  The 
applicant, a government official, argued that he had dismissed his lawyers because he had feared for their 
lives, an argument which must attract a degree of credibility since he and his young daughter had been the 
targets of a shooting incident which had killed his driver, The ECtHR were not swayed by this contention. 
45 Richard v France (1998) Reports 1998-II: a settlement agreement, concerning a first application before 
the ECtHR in relation to the length of the trial, included a declaration that the applicant would ‘waive the 
right to bring any further proceedings on this account …’.  The ECtHR concluded that this was not a 
waiver of the right to take action concerning the length of the proceedings after the point of the settlement 
agreement.  In Young v United Kingdom, the disabled applicant was asked at a disciplinary hearing whether 
she required ‘help’.  She replied in the negative and consequently was not informed that ‘help’ included the 
possibility of legal assistance.  The ECtHR considered the failure to expressly offer legal assistance, rather 
than simply ‘help’, could not lead to the conclusion that the applicant had waived her right to legal 
representation at a hearing which led to an additional period of detention of several days.    
46 Sejdovic v Italy Report of Judgments and Decisions 2006-II [99] – where the court found that a public 
statement that the applicant had ‘no intention of responding to summons’ to face a criminal prosecution of 
which he was aware, despite the fact that the court had failed to notify him of the proceedings issued 
against him.   
47 Le Compte v Belgium: the applicants wanted and claimed to have their disciplinary proceedings heard in 
public.  Hence they had not unequivocally waived their right to a public hearing.  Le Compte, Van Leuven 
& De Meyere  v Belgium Series A No 43 (1981) [59] 
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Unequivocal waiver of an Article 6(1) right may also be implied.  In the case of 
Suovaniemi v Finland48, the ECtHR considered that a ‘voluntary waiver of court 
proceedings in favour of arbitration’ was capable of amounting to a tacit, unequivocal, 
waiver of certain Article 6(1) procedural guarantees.  There is no reason to doubt that the 
ECtHR would extend this reasoning to other forms of ADR procedure.  Hence, a person 
who voluntarily submits to mediation and reaches an agreement in that process may be 
considered to have unequivocally waived their right of access to court.  There is no need 
to expressly waive the right, the action of submitting to the alternative resolution process 
amounts to a tacit waiver. 
 
b) A role for intention? 
 
However, it is not straightforward to find consistency in the ECtHR decisions in relation 
to the requirement that waiver of a right guaranteed by Article 6(1) must be unequivocal.  
A coherent explanation could be found in the notion of intention.   It is arguable that 
where an individual has made an express statement of waiver, the individual’s intention 
can be impliedly construed from the deliberately provided verbal or written 
announcement.  The notion of intention may also provide an explanation for the ECtHR’s 
strict construction of the wording of express statements of waiver in certain cases.  For 
example, in the case of Young v United Kingdom, the applicant had responded negatively 
to the question of whether she required ‘help’ at a disciplinary hearing.  The question was 
ambiguous as there was no express mention that the potential help offered was legal in 
nature and could equally have been general assistance to accommodate her disability.   
Hence, there was no clear intention on her part to waive her right to legal assistance.   
 
The notion of intention has been expressly mentioned by the ECtHR in relation to 
unequivocal waiver in the case of Jones v United Kingdom.49  In that case the applicant 
had deliberately chosen not to attend his trial for alleged conspiracy to commit robbery.  
                                                 
48 Suovaniemi v Finland Application No 31737/96 Decision 23 February 1999 
49 Jones v United Kingdom Application No 30900/02 Decision 09/09/2003.: the application was declared 
inadmissible on other grounds. 
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There was no express waiver and, hence, the ECtHR considered whether the applicant 
had impliedly waived his right not to be present and defend himself at the trial.  The 
ECtHR held that the applicant, as a layperson, could not have known that his refusal 
would result in a trial and conviction in his absence; particularly as it was not clear that 
this was permissible under national law at that time.  Hence, the applicant had not 
‘unequivocally and intentionally’ waived his right.  Here the idea of intention was 
expressly linked by the Court to the fact that the individual could not have had knowledge 
of the consequences of his action and hence could not be said to have unequivocally 
waived his right.    
 
The role of intention would seem especially significant in relation to implied or tacit 
waiver and hence its development by the ECtHR would be particularly useful in the light 
of the strong pressure on individuals throughout Europe, and in England and Wales, to 
mediate their civil claims.  Since the voluntary undertaking of an ADR procedure has 
been held by the ECtHR to amount to tacit waiver of the right of access to court50, this 
would ensure that national authorities put in place sufficient safeguards to ensure that 
individuals are aware that, in consequence of a settlement at mediation or other ADR 
process, they forego the right of access to court in relation to that claim.  This is of 
particular importance in jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, where mediations are 
frequently conducted against the clock, with a strong desire to complete the process 
within a short time frame, and where mediators may take an active role in encouraging 
individuals to settle the claim on the day of the mediation.  Individuals at that stage are 
likely to be tired and less aware of the need to ensure careful drafting of the settlement 
agreement.  From the national perspective, too, it would seem advisable that, when 
individuals undertake mediation or other ADR procedure, they are made aware of the 
consequences of settling the claim, in terms of Article 6(1) protection and the right of 
access to court, of their implied decision.  It is feasible that this could be ensured by an 
appropriate development of the second requirement of an effective waiver.   
 
                                                 
50 Suovaniemi v Finland (n54); Deweer v Belgium (1980) 2 EHRR 439 
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2) The Waiver Must be Accompanied by Minimal Safeguards Commensurate to the 
Importance of the Right Waived 
 
The ECtHR has further specified that, even where a waiver is unequivocal, it ‘must be 
accompanied by sufficient guarantees commensurate to the importance of the right 
waived’.  It is unclear from the case law as to what amounts to ‘sufficient guarantees’ or 
‘minimal safeguards’ (as the test is sometimes worded), nor how to weigh the importance 
of the Article 6 right at issue.  However, two concerns evident are that an applicant has 
waived his Article 6(1) right without recourse to independent legal advice or that there 
appears to be a lack of knowledge relevant to the particular waiver. 
 
a) Importance of Right Waived 
 
No clear guidance emerges from the case law on the doctrine of waiver in the context of 
Article 6(1) about how to assess the importance of the right allegedly waived51.  
However, the ECtHR has consistently placed a high value on the right of access to court.  
The Commission  has stated that ‘the right to be heard in the determination of civil rights 
is one of the most fundamental under Article 6(1)’ and that the ‘requirements which 
surround its waiver are therefore particularly demanding’52.  The ECtHR in the case of 
Golder v UK53, which established that the right of access to court is inherent to the 
procedural guarantees of Article 6(1), based its reasoning on the fundamental importance 
of the rule of law to the ECHR and the fact that ‘in civil matters one can scarcely 
conceive of the rule of law without there being a possibility of having access to the 
courts’.  But there was also a clear concern to protect the jurisdiction of the national 
courts to hear civil matters:  
 
                                                 
51 It is evident that the ECtHR, for example, considers the right to an impartial and independent tribunal of 
supreme importance, particularly in regard to its function in ensuring confidence in the judicial system.  
See: Ozerov v Russia Application No 64962/01 Judgment 18/05/2010 [49] 
52 Tsirlis & Kouloumpas v Greece Application Nos 19233/91 & 19234/91Report (31) (1996) [98]; 
Giorgiadis v Greece Application No 21522/93 Report (31) (1996) [47] 
53 Golder v United Kingdom (1975) Series A No 18 (1975) 1 EHRR 524 
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Were [Article 6(1)] to be understood as concerning exclusively the conduct of an action 
which had already been initiated before a court, a Contracting State could, without acting 
in breach of that text, do away with its courts, or take away their jurisdiction to determine 
certain classes of civil actions and entrust it to organs dependent on the Government.54   
 
Subsequently the ECtHR has held that States have a responsibility to ensure that legal aid 
or assistance should be available where an individual would otherwise be denied access55 
or would have ineffective access56 or should ensure that procedures are sufficiently 
uncomplicated for individuals to represent themselves in court proceedings57.  It is 
evident that the ECtHR has adopted a robust position in order to ensure that individuals 
are able to bring or defend their claims in the national courts.   It would, therefore, seem 
that a waiver of this right should be accompanied by significant safeguards.  However, it 
is not clear from the case law what might constitute sufficient safeguards.   
 
i) Legislation and Legal Advice 
 
The case law suggests that legal representation provides an important safeguard.  In the 
Suovaniemi case58 the ECtHR considered that the fact that the applicants had been 
represented throughout the arbitration procedure ensured that the waiver of their right to 
impartial arbitrators by the applicants was accompanied by sufficient guarantees.  
Similarly, the case of Zu Leiningen v Germany59 concerned a friendly settlement which 
involved the withdrawal of proceedings relating to an inheritance dispute60.  The fact that 
                                                 
54 ibid [35] 
55 Airey v Ireland Series A No 93 (1979) 2 EHRR 305 
56 Steel & Morris v United Kingdom (2005) Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2005-II [59]-[62].  See S 
Shipman ‘Steel & Morris v United Kingdom: Legal Aid in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 25 
CJQ 5 and S Shipman ‘Defamation and Legal Aid in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) 24 CJQ 
23  
57 Airey v Ireland (n61) [24]-[26] 
58 Suovaniemi v Finland Application No 31737/96 Decision 23 February 1999.  It should be noted that the 
ECtHR has yet to decide whether it is acceptable to waive the right to an impartial judge in court 
proceedings. 
59 Zu Leiningen v Germany Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2005-XIII 
60 See Pfeifer & Plankl v Austria Series A No 227 (1992) for a contrasting case in which the EctHR found 
that the lack of legal advice, together with no legal basis in Austrian law for the waiver of the right to an 
impartial tribunal, led to a violation of Article 6(1). 
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the applicant had been represented by legal counsel during negotiations was influential in 
the finding that the waiver of the right to pursue proceedings in the court was effective.   
 
This aspect of the ECtHR jurisprudence may be of relevance to a claim that a person who 
has submitted to mediation, and has settled his claim, has waived his right of access to a 
court.  In particular, where the individual has been legally represented prior to, and during 
a mediation process, it may prove difficult for him to argue that in undertaking that 
process, and reaching a settlement agreement as a result of that process, there were 
insufficient safeguards to protect him from a waiver of his right of access to a court.  The 
same may not be true where an individual is not represented by legal counsel, particularly 
where the waiver of the right is tacit rather than express, and is due to the fact of 
undertaking a mediation process and reaching a settlement agreement rather than due to 
an express waiver of that right.  Of note here is the fact that the applicant in the Zu 
Leiningen case, had agreed as part of the settlement that no further action on the 
proceedings would be taken.  In relation to settlement agreements reached at mediation, it 
may not be clear to a lay person who is unrepresented that the effect of the agreement 
reached, particularly once this is reduced to writing, will be to preclude access to court on 
the same issue.  Hence, it would seem a sensible precaution for a case management judge, 
legal representative or mediator to explain the binding effect of an agreement reached 
through a mediation process to ensure that the individuals concerned are aware that 
reaching such an agreement in general precludes further recourse to the courts on the 
same issue.  This would be a prudent introduction in the future regulation of any 
mediation practice and is related to the second concern gleaned from the ECtHR case 
law: that an individual has relevant knowledge when tacitly or expressly agreeing to 
waive an Article 6(1) right. 
 
ii) Lack of Relevant Knowledge: A Test of Reasonable Foreseeability? 
  
The ECtHR has refused to accept that an individual has unequivocally waived his Article 
6(1) right where there is a lack of knowledge relevant to the right waived (for example, 
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where an individual has no knowledge of criminal proceedings issued against him61), and 
has held that an individual must be able to reasonably foresee what the consequences of 
his conduct (in waiving the right) would be62.  Whilst the cases on this point mostly occur 
in the context of criminal proceedings, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the 
requirement that the consequences of waiver must be reasonably foreseeable is relevant 
also to the context of disputes over civil rights and obligations.   The most recent 
formulation of this principle states that the waiver must ‘constitute a knowing and 
informed relinquishment of the right’63.  Hence, it would seem a minimal and rational 
safeguard to ensure that individuals who undertake a mediation process and, who 
consequently settle their claims, are informed appropriately of the impact on their right of 
access to court under Article 6(1).  This seems particularly sensible in the light of the fact 
that the ECtHR has stated the procedural safeguards in place must be commensurate to 
the importance of the right waived. 
 
3) The Right Waived Must Not be Counter to Important Public Interests 
 
Article 6(1) is concerned with the procedural guarantees of the right to a fair trial.  
However, where an individual waives his right of access to court, this precludes the court 
from deciding the substantive legal issue.  In some cases, however, the ECtHR has held 
that the substantive legal matter at stake is of such public importance that an applicant’s 
waiver cannot be accepted.  Such cases include, for example, the right not to be racially 
discriminated against in the provision of education (Orsus v Italy)64.  The ECtHR 
appeared to assume, in Zaichenko v Russia65, that the issue of public interest is also a 
principle of the doctrine of waiver in the context of Article 6(1), at least in relation to 
criminal proceedings.  It is unclear whether the principle extends to the doctrine as it 
relates to civil proceedings but it is arguable, where the subject matter of proceedings is 
                                                 
61 Colozza v Italy Series A No 89 (1985) [27]-[32]; Oberschlick v Austria Series A No 204 (1991) [48]-[51] 
62 Makarenko v Russia Application No 5962/03 Judgment 22/12/09 [135]; Syathan Demir v Turkey 
Application No 25381/02 Judgment 28/07/2009 [38]; Sejdovic v Italy Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
63 Makarenko v Russia Application No 5962/03 Judgment 22/12/09 [135] 
64 Orsus v Italy Application No 15766/03 Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2010.  The right not to be 
racially discriminated against was of such public import that the applicants’ failure to object to racial 
segregation could not amount to waiver of the right.   
65 Aleksander Zaichenko v Russia Application No 39660/02 Judgment 18/02/2010 
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of particular public importance, that the ECtHR may find that a mediated settlement 
which deprives an individual of full protection for a particular right falls within this 
principle.66  As already shown in the case of Orsus, the ECtHR considers the right not to 
be racially discriminated against of such public importance.  Hence, it would be wise to 
ensure that care is taken to ensure that there are significant safeguards in place to ensure 
that, if individuals undertake a mediation process in relation to discrimination claims, 
they are fully informed of the effect of settlement on their legal rights.  The same is likely 
to be true of cases involving human rights issues and in relation to judicial review 
proceedings, particularly since one of the prime concerns of the right of access to court 
under Article 6(1), as enunciated by the ECtHR, is to protect individuals against the 
arbitrary exercise of executive discretionary power.67 
  
4)  Waiver must not be Tainted by Constraint 
 
The final consideration, however, is that the waiver must not be tainted by constraint68.  
In Deweer v Belgium, the ECtHR stated that: 
 
… in a democratic society too great an importance attaches to the “right to a court” … for 
its benefit to be forfeited solely by reason of the fact that an individual is a party to a 
settlement reached in the course of a procedure ancillary to court proceedings … absence 
of constraint is at all events one of the conditions to be satisfied 69 
  
Since a focus of this article has been to consider the pressure that is brought to bear on 
individuals to mediate their claims, it is useful to analyse what, according to the ECtHR 
in the case of Deweer, constituted constraint.  The relevant facts of the case were that Mr 
Deweer had been charged with the criminal offence of over-pricing meat for sale in his 
butcher shop.  Under the ensuing closure order the applicant was faced with the choice of 
paying a fine by way of compensation for his alleged offence or the closure of his 
                                                 
66 For example, discrimination or human rights claims or claims which would usually be dealt with by way 
of judicial review. 
67 See, for example, Matthews v Ministry of Defence [2003] UKHL 4 [2003] 1 AC 1163 [25]-[29]; Tinnelly 
& McElduff v United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 249 
68 Deweer v Belgium (1980) 2 EHRR 439 [49] 
69 ibid 
 19 
business within 48 hours of issue of the order until a criminal hearing to determine his 
guilt.  Faced with the possibility of the closure of his business, the resultant loss of 
income, business and client goodwill, an inability to pay his staff, together with the 
uncertainty of duration between closure and the potential trial, Mr Deweer opted to pay 
the fine.  However, in consequence of doing so he had to forego his right of access to a 
court: this despite the fact that he had an arguable defence.  The opportunity to defend his 
alleged offence may have resulted in a vindication of his reputation as well as non-
payment of the fine.   
 
The Belgian government contended that Mr Deweer had waived his right to a court and 
hence there was no violation of Article 6(1).  In accepting the offer of a ‘friendly 
settlement’ he avoided the risk of a sentence which may have been more severe, together 
with the permanent closure of his business.  Also, the government argued, to accept that 
settlement or compromise in criminal cases is legitimate necessarily entails accepting that 
such settlement ‘always takes place under some form of constraint’, namely the fear of 
criminal proceedings or the threat of a higher penalty70.  Whilst the ECtHR accepted that 
‘the prospect of having to appear in court is … liable to prompt a willingness to 
compromise’ in such circumstances, and that this pressure was not of itself incompatible 
with Article 6(1), it did not accept that it was the threat of criminal proceedings that 
influenced Mr Deweer to accept the settlement offer.  However, even if fear of criminal 
proceedings may have constituted an unacceptable pressure, it was unlikely, according to 
the ECtHR, that Mr Deweer was apprehensive about proceedings as an acquittal appeared 
not improbable.  Rather it was the threat of closure of his business within 48 hours that 
constituted the constraint in this case.  As the ECtHR pointed out, Mr Deweer was faced 
with the prospect of not only a loss of income over a possible period of several months, 
but also with the potential of having to continue to pay his staff, and the loss of 
customers: this would have resulted in considerable consequential loss.  The ECtHR also 
considered that the modest nature of the settlement fine (as compared to the possibility of 
a fine of up to 3000 times higher if found guilty of the offence at trial), added to the 
pressure of the closure order, thus rendering ‘the pressure so compelling that it is not 
                                                 
70 ibid [51(a)] 
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surprising that Mr Deweer yielded’71.  In answer to the government’s argument that there 
was nothing to prevent Mr Deweer from refusing the settlement and taking legal 
measures to challenge the closure order or to claim damages for loss arising from the 
closure of his business, the ECtHR considered that national legislative provisions made 
this an unlikely route of redress72. 
 
It is possible to highlight a number of comparisons that may usefully be made with the 
facts and circumstances of the Deweer case, together with the conclusions of the ECtHR 
in that case, and the potential argument that a litigant has waived his right of access to a 
court by undertaking a mediation process leading to settlement of a claim. 
 
First, the ECtHR accepted that in a situation where the prospects of the trial itself 
engendered fear, such as where the consequences of refusing a settlement would lead to 
trial and to a potentially more severe penalty, this pressure alone would not be 
incompatible with Article 6(1)73.  Hence, there would be no violation of the defendant’s 
right to a court.  Similarly, it would not appear possible for a respondent to civil 
proceedings (faced on the one hand with the choice of accepting an offer to settle or to 
mediate in order to reach a settlement, and on the other the prospect of a civil trial), to 
argue that the fear of a court trial per se, or even of a higher award in damages, 
constituted such a pressure that this forced him or her to accept a settlement and thus 
violated Article 6(1).   
 
However in deciding whether to refuse to mediate a claim in this jurisdiction, whether at 
the suggestion of the court or at the request of the opponent, a party encounters additional 
pressures, first, in the form of authoritative encouragement and secondly, in the form of 
potential adverse costs74.  
 
a)  Authoritative encouragement 
                                                 
71 ibid [51(b)] 
72 ibid [52] 
73 ibid [51(b)] 
74 Court approaches to encouraging parties to undertake an ADR procedure have been discussed in detail in 
S Shipman ‘Court Approaches to ADR in the Civil Justice System’ (2006) 25 CJQ 181, 186-194 
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An individual faced with the option of going to mediation or holding out for a trial may 
face pressure in the form of advice or encouragement from two principal sources.  First, if 
legally represented, his advisors may recommend mediation.  Legal advisors are 
themselves open to criticism from the courts for failure to pursue this option75.  Secondly, 
a litigant may be encouraged by the court to undertake such a procedure.  It is worth 
noting here that the courts themselves face a degree of pressure to encourage such 
procedures76: the lower courts may attract criticism from the higher courts for failure to 
fulfil their duty to further the overriding objective of the Civil Procedure Rules77 and the 
higher courts face political pressure to encourage the use of ADR procedures78.  The 
persuasive influence of the courts, and of any acting legal advisors, should not be 
underestimated79.  With regard to conformity with Article 6(1), however, it does not 
appear likely that the ECtHR would construe such influence on its own as constraint, to 
the extent that this would nullify a tacit waiver of the right of access to court.  In relation 
to the right of access to court under Article 6(1), the ECtHR is concerned that an 
individual has a real opportunity to bring or defend his claim before the courts80.  It is 
difficult to assert that an individual who settles his claim and thus foregoes this right, 
even in the face of strong advice from legal professionals or indeed from the court itself, 
has had no such opportunity.  In the Deweer case, the applicant had no opportunity to 
defend the alleged offence following payment of the settlement fee.  Whilst he no longer 
faced closure of his business, the effect of the payment was to bar absolutely the 
possibility of a criminal trial81.  However, if he had refused to pay the sum involved it 
was acknowledged by the ECtHR and by the Belgian government that he would have 
faced a trial82.  Thus, it was not that he had no real opportunity to defend the charge 
against him that led to the conclusion that his right of access to the court had been 
                                                 
75 ibid 188-190 
76 This point has been discussed in relation to criticism of legal advisors but is equally applicable to the 
lower courts ‘Court Approaches to ADR’ (n81) 188-190 
77 The Civil Procedure Rules have the overriding objective of enabling the courts to deal with cases justly 
(CPR 1.1) 
78 ibid 182-186 
79 ibid 182 
80 For example: Winterwerp v The Netherlands Series A No 33 (1979) 2 EHRR 387 
81 Deweer v Belgium (1980) 2 EHRR 439 [15] 
82 ibid [51] 
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violated.  Neither, currently under the CPR, does an individual’s refusal to undertake 
ADR halt the process of civil litigation.  In such an instance the resources and protection 
of the court remain available.   
 
However, parties deciding whether or not to accept the court’s advice to undertake an 
ADR procedure, or to refuse an opponent’s offer of mediation, are in England and 
Wales subject to a further pressure: the possibility of adverse costs should the court find 
that a party has unreasonably refused to mediate83.  Additionally, following the 
decision in Carleton v Strutt & Parker, where the successful claimant’s costs award 
was reduced due to his unreasonable conduct in the mediation process, there is the 
further possibility that refusal to engage fully with the mediation process itself may 
attract adverse costs84.  However, it should be noted that there are potential difficulties 
with this decision due to the fact that mediation proceedings are generally covered by 
the without prejudice rule.   
 
b)  Adverse costs  
 
i) The ECtHR and Litigation Costs 
 
According to Halsey v Milton Keynes General Trust NHS85, it is appropriate for a court to 
make an adverse costs award where a party has unreasonably refused (at the request of 
the court or another party) to undertake an ADR procedure.  The cost of legal 
proceedings in this jurisdiction (irrespective of the potential for adverse costs), is such 
that a party may prefer to compromise the claim rather than enforce his rights or vindicate 
his reputation.  The prohibitive nature of the cost of legal proceedings has, in itself, been 
                                                 
83 For more detailed discussion of this see ‘Court Approaches to ADR’ (n81) 192-193 and following 
84 Carleton (Earl of Malmesbury) v Strutt & Parker [2008] EWHC 424 (QB); [2008] 5 Costs LR 736.  
Additionally, Article 7 European Mediation Directive (Directive 2008/52 on certain aspects of mediation in 
civil and commercial matters)  requires Member States to ensure that neither mediators or others involved 
in a mediation process are compelled to give evidence in civil, commercial or arbitration proceedings 
regarding information arising out of a mediation process except where necessary for overriding reasons of 
public policy or where necessary to enforce a mediation agreement.   
85 Halsey v Milton Keynes General Trust NHS [2004] EWCA Civ 576 [2004] 1 WLR 3002 [9] 
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the subject of a number of challenges before the ECtHR86.  In such cases the applicant 
has alleged that the actual or potential costs of litigation have prevented him from either 
pursuing a claim through the courts or from advancing an effective action87.  It is worth 
noting at this point that in such a situation the individual concerned has not been refused 
access to the courts, rather it is the direct or indirect effect of the lack of funds that acts as 
an impediment to the courts.  Whilst Article 6, ECHR, does not expressly require that a 
contracting state provides public funding for a party seeking to make use of the civil 
courts, the ECtHR has found on occasion that failure to do so may violate an individual’s 
rights88.  For example, in Steel & Morris v United Kingdom89, the applicants successfully 
asserted that they had been denied effective access to court and that there had been an 
inequality of arms viz-a-viz their multi-national corporation opponent90.  The applicants, 
defendants to defamation litigation, had been refused legal aid to defend the longest trial 
in English legal history91.  Given the success of Mr Morris and Miss Steel before the 
ECtHR, it seems unlikely that the ECtHR would have less sympathy for an applicant who 
has been unable to defend a claim through the courts at all due to lack of funding (and, as 
a result, has had to settle his opponent’s claim), than for an applicant who has, in fact, 
progressed his cause ineffectively through the courts.  This additional pressure to settle, 
rather than face the expense of costly legal proceedings, is enhanced by the indemnity 
principle, such that the unsuccessful party to the litigation is required to pay not only his 
own legal costs but also the reasonable costs of the winner.  
 
The concern for this discussion, however, is not with whether a litigant is unable to 
advance or defend a claim due to lack of funding, but rather with whether a litigant who 
undergoes an ADR procedure may successfully argue that the pressure to undertake that 
                                                 
86 For a more in-depth analysis of such cases: S Shipman ‘Defamation and Legal Aid in the European Court 
of Human Rights’ (2005) 24 CJQ 23, S Shipman ‘Steel & Morris v United Kingdom: Legal Aid in the 
European Court of Human Rights’ (2006) 25 CJQ 5 
87 ‘Steel & Morris v United Kingdom: Legal Aid in the ECHR’ (n57) 7-12 for an exploration of the 
distinction between the situation where an applicant has been effectively denied a right of access to court 
and where an individual has been denied the opportunity to present an effective claim or defence 
88 In the ground breaking case of Airey v Ireland, the ECtHR found that Mrs Airey had effectively been 
denied access to the courts to claim a judicial separation from her husand owing to the fact that legal aid 
was not available for such proceedings. Airey v Ireland Series A No 32 (1979) 2 EHRR 305 
89 Steel & Morris v United Kingdom (Application No 64816/01) 15 February 2005 
90 ibid [72] 
91 ibid [19] 
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process constitutes constraint, thus countering the potential argument that in 
compromising the action through a mediation process he has waived his right of access to 
a court.  Lack of funds may, of course, constitute a significant factor in the pressure faced 
by a potential litigant to avoid court proceedings but the possibility of an adverse costs 
award for unreasonable refusal to undertake an ADR procedure further increases the 
pressure on potential litigants.  As noted above, the indemnity principle may operate to 
discourage potential litigants from pursuing a claim through the courts.  However, it may 
also have the contrary effect where a party has a strong case.  The principle may be 
instrumental in encouraging litigants to fight their cause through the courts, since it 
ensures that the successful litigant is able to recover legal costs from the unsuccessful 
opponent.  Thus, a litigant who believes he has a good prospect of success is able to 
pursue his claim through the courts based on the probability of recovering his costs from 
the opposing party92.  However, an adverse costs award undermines this principle.  Even 
where a party believes he has a good case, his refusal to undertake ADR, may mean that, 
if successful, he does not recover his costs or, if unsuccessful, he faces a higher costs 
award than he would otherwise have done93.  Thus, the issue for discussion here is 
whether a party can be considered to have waived his right of access to a court in 
submitting to an ADR procedure in the light of this threat.  The answer is not 
straightforward.   
 
If the national court approach were to award adverse costs consistently for a refusal to 
undertake ADR then it would appear likely that this could constitute constraint in certain 
circumstances.  Since the ECtHR is concerned with the application of a particular rule or 
procedure to the case before it rather than with its general operation it is unlikely that the 
threat of adverse costs per se would be found to conflict with the right of access to a 
court.  Instead the ECtHR would explore whether such a threat constituted constraint in 
the circumstances of the particular case before it.  In the Deweer case, it was the threat of 
                                                 
92 Defendants may not be able to recover costs in certain proceedings following the recent review of costs 
in civil litigation in England and Wales.  Civil Procedure Rules 44.13 - 44.17. 
93 Dunnett v Railtrack plc (in Railway Administration) [2002] EWCA Civ 303 [2002] 1 WLR 2434 for a 
case where the respondent’s belief in the strength of the defence was vindicated through the result of the 
appeal, but where no costs were awarded on the basis of a refusal to mediate the claim.  For examples of a 
party’s erroneous belief in the merits of his cause: Hurst v Leeming [2001] EWHC 105 (Ch) [2003] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep 379, Burchell v Bullard [2005] EWCA Civ 358 
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closure of the applicant’s business with its attendant financial consequences that tainted 
waiver of the right of access to court with constraint94.  In that case the ECtHR did not, 
unfortunately, enunciate any criteria for assessing constraint (and the issue appears to 
have received little if any discussion in subsequent cases95).  However, the important 
features appear to be the direct and potentially severe nature of the threat of closure.  A 
further factor in the Deweer case may have been the immediacy of effect of the closure 
order (within 48 hours of receipt of the order).  If an automatic award of adverse costs 
were to be the result of refusal to mediate then that threat would also have direct and 
potentially severe financial consequences, depending on the potential costs involved and 
the individual’s resources.  Whilst the financial consequences would not be as immediate 
as in the case of Deweer, the decision as to whether to undertake an ADR procedure has 
to be made against the timescale of proceedings and also against the case management 
duty of the court to further the overriding objective of the CPR.  As one aspect of this, the 
CPR rules are designed to promote expedition.  Hence, a decision as to whether to accept 
or refuse the opportunity to use such a process may have to be made promptly.  It is 
accepted, however, that the financial consequences of an adverse costs order would most 
likely have a delayed effect.  Whilst, in the Deweer case, the threat of closure was 
immediate, it is arguable that immediacy ought not to be a required factor.  Whilst an 
immediate threat certainly adds to the pressure, the potential financial consequences of 
paying litigation costs may be as severe as losing one’s business or one’s home.  If it is 
not possible to raise finances for legal costs in the immediate future it is unlikely that 
such costs will be able to be met at the time of the trial.  Hence, it is certainly arguable 
that an automatic adverse costs award for refusal to undertake an ADR procedure would 
have the potential to violate an individual’s right of access to court. 
 
                                                 
94 It is not clear from the judgment whether Mr Deweer had other financial resources available to him 
(although this would appear unlikely), hence, it is difficult to assess whether the ECtHR would have found 
that this threat amounted to constraint if Mr Deweer had had other means to provide for his needs and to 
pay the salaries of his staff.  But even in such an eventuality, Mr Deweer would still have faced the 
potential loss of his customers and the difficulties of rebuilding his business at some indefinite point in the 
future.   
95 The matter has only been briefly raised and dismissed in relation to applications declared by the 
Commission to be inadmissible.  Examples include M v The Federal Republic of Germany Application 
12725/87 Decision of 2 October 1989, Bojlekov v Poland Application 22819/93 Decision of 9 April 1997 
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ii) Adverse Costs for Unreasonable Refusal to Mediate 
 
In England at least, adverse costs are not automatically awarded: rather they may be 
imposed following trial for an unreasonable refusal to mediate a claim.  A significant 
difficulty for a potential litigant in deciding whether to reject a request for mediation is 
that it is uncertain at that time what may amount to unreasonable conduct.  The Court of 
Appeal, in the case of Halsey v Milton Keynes General Trust NHS96, has highlighted a 
number of relevant factors including (amongst other features) the nature of the dispute, 
the merits of the case, the prospects of success of a mediation procedure, and the 
encouragement of the court97.  A brief exploration of certain of the relevant factors 
highlights how these features are not conclusive and consequently are likely to leave a 
party uncertain as to whether his refusal to undertake an ADR procedure is unreasonable.   
 
For example, with regard to assessing the merits of the case the test is an objective one, 
made by a judge with the benefit of hindsight after the judgment has been delivered.  It is 
quite clear that the subjective belief of potential litigants, particularly those who are not 
legally represented (and even allowing for the use of Pre-Action Protocols to ensure that 
parties are well-informed), may not accurately reflect the eventual outcome.  For 
example, in the case of Burchell v Bullard98, the defendants were found to have acted 
unreasonably in refusing the claimant’s offer to mediate the claim.  One factor was the 
court’s finding that the defendants ‘behaved unreasonably in believing ... that their case 
was so watertight that they need not engage in attempts to settle’.  This is hardly 
surprising: the law reports are full of cases where lower courts and the appellate courts 
disagree about what the outcome should be99.  If the courts themselves cannot agree on 
the outcome in a particular case, it is unlikely that a potential litigant, who is emotionally 
involved and who may be financially dependent on the outcome, can be expected to make 
an accurate and objective assessment.  However, on occasion the court has also found 
                                                 
96 Halsey v Milton Keynes General Trust NHS [2004] EWCA Civ 576 [2004] 1 WLR 3002 
97 For a full discussion of this case see S Shipman ‘Court Approaches to ADR in the Civil Justice System’ 
(2006) 25 CJQ 181,194-211 
98 Burchell v Bullard (n70) 
99 See for example Reed Executive plc v Reed Business Information Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 887 [2004] 1 
WLR 3026 
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that the losing party, who has refused to mediate a claim, should not be penalised in costs 
where an estimation of the strengths of the claim was actually incorrect.  For example, in 
Hickman v Blake Lapthorn100, the first defendants were willing to mediate a professional 
negligence claim, but the second defendants had refused.  Judgment was awarded for the 
claimants at £130,000 whereas the second defendants had valued the claim at a much 
lower figure.  At the costs hearing, the first defendant argued that the judge should take 
into account the second defendant’s refusal to mediate when deciding how to apportion 
the costs between them.  The judge refused to do so, on the basis that the refusal was not 
unreasonable as the second defendant’s insurers did not wish to pay more than they 
thought the claim was worth101.  The view of the value of the claim was not unreasonable 
as ‘it had been formed after a review of the case by experienced solicitors and 
counsel’102.  The judge appeared to be concerned that defendants should not be coerced 
into agreeing to settle for more than they consider the claim to be worth, even if this 
would save even more on costs, because otherwise claimants could use the threat of costs 
to ‘extract more than a claim is worth’.  This is a worthy consideration.  However, the 
difficulty with this particular approach is that in many, if not the majority of cases, the 
merits or value of a claim will have been made in the light of review by experienced legal 
advisors.  The reason that the defendants were facing negligence proceedings in the 
Hickman case is that they had previously advised the claimant to accept a settlement 
figure in a personal injury case which was too low because they had failed to allow for 
the possibility that the claimant may never be able to work again.  They had been, 
therefore, already incorrect in their assessment of the value of the claim.  Moreover, the 
claimant had been represented in relation to the negligence proceedings, so it could 
equally be argued that experienced legal advisors had come to a significantly different 
view of the claim’s value.   
 
The above cases demonstrate the difficulty of basing a decision as to the 
unreasonableness of a refusal to mediate on the merits of the claim.  An objective 
assessment as to the merits of a claim is not always straightforward, the legal advisors for 
                                                 
100 Hickman v Blake Lapthorn [2006] EWHC 12 [2006] All ER (D) 67 
101 ibid [30] 
102 ibid [29] 
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opposing parties may form significantly different opinions as to the strength or value of 
the claim and, even where a party wins a claim and the opponent’s refusal to mediate is 
based on an incorrect assessment as to the claim’s strength, the court may decide that the 
erroneous view is not an unreasonable one to take. 
 
A similar difficulty arises when assessing the prospects of success of a mediation process.  
As the Court of Appeal indicated in the Halsey case, this may depend both on the 
willingness of the parties to compromise103 (the fact that parties have instigated the 
litigation process may be suggestive of the fact that there is some intransigence or lack of 
willingness to move on the part of at least one party to the proceedings) as well as on 
indeterminable factors such as the ability of the mediator104.  If the court faces difficulty 
in determining, at the case management stage of proceedings, whether the prospects of 
success are good, it is unlikely that the parties themselves are in a position to make a 
sensible judgment105.  Again, this is likely to be even more problematic where a party 
does not have the benefit of legal advice or representation: not only for the unrepresented 
party without prior legal knowledge (or education as to the perceived potential benefits of 
an ADR process) but also for his opponent who may arguably face an unpredictable 
adversary.  Whilst an opponent without the protection of legal advisors may be more 
willing to settle for a lower sum it is also possible that such a party may have an 
unrealistic view of the claim value or its merits.  Hence, it may be difficult to predict 
whether an unrepresented party is more or less likely to be willing to compromise.  This 
point is illustrated by the case of Dunnett v Railtrack 106, in which the claimant was 
unsuccessful at first instance.  Following the trial, and in order to prevent an appeal, the 
defendants offered the claimant £2500 to settle the claim107.  Miss Dunnett refused the 
offer and was again unsuccessful on appeal.   At the time of her refusal she was acting as 
a litigant in person108.   
 
                                                 
103 Halsey v Milton Keynes General Trust NHS [2004] EWCA Civ 576 [2004] 1 WLR 3002 [25]-[26] 
104 ibid [27] 
105 ‘Court Approaches to ADR’ (n102) 206 
106 Dunnett v Railtrack plc (in Railway Administration) [2002] EWCA Civ 303 [2002] 1 WLR 2434 
107 ibid [1] 
108 ibid [6] 
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Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the Halsey guidelines as to when adverse costs 
should be awarded for unreasonable refusal to mediate, however, is the role of the court 
in encouraging parties to undertake an ADR procedure.  In England and Wales, under 
CPR 1.4(2)(e) the court is required to encourage parties seeking court litigation to use an 
ADR procedure if it considers that to be appropriate.  The difficulty for the courts in 
assessing when an ADR procedure is appropriate has been explored in a previous 
article109.  One aspect of particular relevance here, however, is that it is not clear how 
much weight will be accorded to this factor when deciding whether a litigant’s refusal is 
unreasonable.  The Court of Appeal has indicated that the more robust the encouragement 
of the court the more likely it is that a party’s refusal will be considered unreasonable 
when the costs decision is made110.  Hence, it is likely that where the court’s 
encouragement is strong the litigant’s refusal will be considered unreasonable.  For 
example, the most robust form of encouragement offered by the court to a litigant is an 
ADR Order, made in the Admiralty and Commercial Court111.  Under this order, if the 
case does not settle as a result of such a procedure, the parties are required to ‘inform the 
Court … what steps towards ADR have been taken and … why such steps have failed’112.  
In Halsey the Court of Appeal indicated that a party who refused such an order would 
‘run the risk for that reason alone’ that the refusal would be unreasonable, irrespective of 
other factors involved113.  Since such a refusal is almost certain to lead to an adverse 
costs award this threat is likely to exert significant pressure to use an ADR procedure.  
Such compelling pressure arguably constitutes constraint such that a potential litigant’s 
resultant waiver of his right of access to court must be considered tainted. 
 
Whilst robust court encouragement appears likely to equate with an unreasonable refusal, 
the influence of the court’s encouragement is less clear when the court uses more limited 
persuasion.  This creates a further difficulty.  This aspect of an assessment of 
unreasonable refusal is essentially concerned with a matter of degree: where the court’s 
                                                 
109 ‘Court Approaches to ADR’ (n102) 194-218 
110 Halsey (n111) [29].  Discussed in ‘Court Approaches to ADR’ (n102) 206-210 
111 Admiralty and Commercial Courts Guide (ACG) Appendix 7 Civil Court Practice 2005 (Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths London 2005) 1825 
112 ibid [5] 
113 Halsey (n111) [31] 
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encouragement is robust this appears likely to indicate a finding of unreasonableness.  
Where it is weaker this factor may be less influential.  But a matter of degree is not 
always easy to assess.  Neither does the case law offer significant guidance on this point.  
Whilst a mere suggestion of mediation was sufficient to incur adverse costs in the early 
case of Dunnett v Railtrack 114, this factor appears to have had less significance in 
subsequent cases115.  However, this is not decisive.   
 
Thus, there are a number of uncertainties involved in the decision as to whether or not a 
litigant’s refusal to undertake an ADR procedure is or is not likely to be deemed 
unreasonable and, if so, will incur adverse costs consequences.  The potential for an 
adverse costs award (even if the guidelines for determining an unreasonable refusal were 
more certain), adds significantly to the pressure which faces an individual deciding 
whether or not to undertake ADR.  The uncertainty creates an additional pressure.  It is 
this threat of adverse costs, together with the uncertainty of whether or not it will operate 
in a particular case, which may constitute constraint such that, in the particular 
circumstances of a case, the ECtHR would decide that the individual has not truly waived 
his right of access to a court.   
 
In the context of Article 6(1) the essence of waiver tainted by constraint is that, whilst in 
theory an individual may choose to exercise his right, in reality he or she is heavily 
influenced by the circumstances surrounding that choice.  Arguably, there is no real 
freedom of choice.  The voluntary character of a particular decision depends on the level 
of freedom to choose.  As discussed earlier, the ECtHR has not been prepared to accept 
that an individual has waived an Article 6 right when he has had no knowledge of the 
circumstances that in fact act to deny him that right116.  In that situation there has been no 
waiver as the right has not been acceded voluntarily.  The same must be true where there 
is constraint.  For waiver to be valid there has to be a true choice to concede the particular 
right.  It must at least be arguable that in certain circumstances the risk of an adverse 
costs award is likely to deny the individual concerned a true choice.   
                                                 
114 Dunnett (n114) 
115 For example, Reed v Reed (n104) 
116 8 
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c) A Justification for Waiver Tainted by Constraint? 
 
In the Deweer case the finding that the applicant had been constrained to waive his right 
of access to court was conclusive to a finding of violation of Article 6(1).  There was no 
discussion of whether the state’s constraint was justifiable.  However, since that case the 
ECtHR has introduced the concept of the margin of appreciation into the jurisprudence on 
the right of access to court.  It is suggested that in further developing the doctrine of 
waiver in the context discussed in this article, the ECtHR should recognise that the threat 
of adverse costs and other strong methods of encouragement, such as court orders to 
mediate, amount to pressure such that any waiver of the right of access to court is tainted 
by constraint.  But, in doing so, since the right of access to court is not absolute, the Court 
should also be prepared to consider arguments by State parties that, in the circumstances 
of individual cases, the constraint is justifiable.  This would be the case if the measure 
which restricts access does not impair the very essence of the right, pursues a legitimate 
aim, and strikes a proportionate balance between the public interest and the fundamental 
right of the individual in the circumstances of the case117.  This aspect has been discussed 
at length elsewhere118, in the context of whether compulsory mediation infringes an 
individual’s right of access to court, and it is not possible to do justice to this point here.  
However, it is briefly worth noting that where the aim of a measure which leads to a 
denial of access to court is to enable the general or efficient functioning of the civil 
justice system (for example, in ensuring the efficient use of court resources) or where 
there is concern to protect the interests of others, the ECtHR generally accepts these as 
legitimate aims.  Arguably, as discussed above,119 at least to some extent these concerns 
are reflected in measures which encourage, or even pressurise, individuals to make use of 
mediation or another ADR procedure.  However, such an argument may be countered by 
evidence that the civil justice system is, in fact, self-funding and that the need to persuade 
individuals away from those courts is to ensure sufficient funding is available for criminal 
                                                 
117 Ashingdane v United Kingdom  Series A No 93 (1985) 7 EHRR 528 
118 S Shipman ‘Compulsory Mediation: the Elephant in the Room’ (2011) 30 Civil Justice Quarterly 163 
119 Text to n5, n6, n7 
 32 
justice120.  It would also seem unlikely that the ECtHR would be amenable to arguments 
that a principal reason for discouraging litigation is to prevent individuals from asserting 
their rights as this is too expensive for business (ie the fear of a compensation culture)121.  
However, in the context of Article 6(1), the ECtHR rarely finds that a restrictive measure 
does not pursue a legitimate aim and the decision most usually turns on the issue of 
proportionality.  This aspect depends on whether the restricting measure has a 
disproportionate impact on the particular individual.  The most significant pressure on an 
individual to undertake a mediation process is the threat of adverse costs.  The ECtHR 
has been particularly concerned that financial constraints do not prevent individuals from 
bringing or defending claims in the courts.  Whilst the threat of adverse costs is not a 
direct financial constraint, it may be used to encourage reluctant individuals to undertake 
a mediation or other ADR procedure and, since the case of Carleton v Strutt & Parker122, 
where the successful claimant’s costs award was reduced due to his unreasonable conduct 
in the mediation process, it may be used to encourage reluctant parties at the mediation 
process to engage fully with the process.123  
 
D. Conclusion 
 
This article has suggested that the defence of waiver may encounter difficulties in relation 
to a claim that an applicant has been denied his right of access to court under Article 6(1) 
following recourse to mediation (where either a settlement has been reached at the 
mediation which precludes access to court on that issue or the individual has exhausted 
funds due to the mediation).  The ECtHR has taken a robust approach to the protection of 
the right of access to court under Article 6(1) and it is feasible, in the context of a strong 
impetus away from a rights-based resolution of disputes towards consensual methods, 
that it may yet play a significant role in safeguarding this important constitutional right.  
Whilst voluntary mediation and other ADR procedures offer potential benefits to users, 
the ECtHR is committed to ensuring that States do not manage their civil justice systems 
                                                 
120 (n7) 
121 Text to n8, n9 
122 Carleton (Earl of Malmesbury) v Strutt & Parker [2008] EWHC 424 (QB); [2008] 5 Costs L.R. 736.  
Although, as stated above, this case may be doubted.  Text to n84. 
123 ibid [72] 
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in such a way that the important public function of civil justice is weakened and that 
individuals are prevented from making use of the national courts in order to protect their 
legally enshrined rights and one way in which the ECtHR will be able to ensure that it 
retains the right to scrutinise State moves which potentially undermine Article 6(1), 
however benign the motive, is for the ECtHR to ensure that State parties are not able to 
use the doctrine of waiver as an automatic defence where individuals undertake a 
mediation (or other consensus based ADR procedure).  
 
The doctrine of waiver requires that an individual waives their Article 6(1) right in an 
unequivocal manner and that there are sufficient safeguards in place commensurate to the 
importance of the right.  In this context it seems fundamental that an individual who 
enters mediation is made fully aware that a settlement agreed at the mediation, or 
subsequently, will preclude access to the courts on the settled claim.   
 
Moreover (although it has been argued that it is open for the ECtHR to consider whether, 
in the particular case, the restriction on an individual’s right of access to court is 
justifiable), it appears feasible that the ECtHR may recognise that the pressure brought to 
bear on individuals (in the form of authoritative encouragement from legal advisors and 
the courts and in the threat of adverse costs) is sufficient to taint any unequivocal waiver 
with constraint.  Hence, it may be necessary to reconsider the use of adverse costs awards 
as a method of encouraging individuals to undertake mediation or other ADR procedure.  
A dispute resolution culture where legal advisors are educated as to the benefits of 
mediation, together with sound empirical research which demonstrates the advantages of 
mediation over court-based litigation, must ultimately have a significant impact on its use 
in civil justice.  Finally, it should be noted that the ECtHR may not, in any case, permit 
waiver of the right of access to court in favour of mediation where the substantive legal 
issue in the particular dispute involves a point of public interest, such as racial 
discrimination or an individual’s fundamental human right. 
 
 
